Monetary Policy and the Financing of Firms by Fiorella de Fiore et al.
Estudos e Documentos de Trabalho
Working Papers
17 | 2009





The analyses, opinions and findings of these papers represent the views of the authors,
they are not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal or the Eurosystem.
Please address correspondence to
Pedro Teles
Economics and Research Department
Banco de Portugal, Av. Almirante Reis no. 71, 1150-012 Lisboa, Portugal;
Tel.: 351 21 312 8397, pmpteles@bportugal.ptBANCO DE PORTUGAL
Edition
Economics and Research Department






Documentation, Editing and Museum Division
Editing and Publishing Unit











Legal Deposit No 3664/83Monetary Policy and the Financing of Firms￿
Fiorella De Fiorey , Pedro Telesz , and Oreste Tristaniy
August, 2009
Abstract
How should monetary policy respond to changes in ￿nancial conditions? In this paper
we consider a simple model where ￿rms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks which may force
them to default on their debt. Firms￿assets and liabilities are denominated in nominal
terms and predetermined when shocks occur. Monetary policy can therefore a⁄ect the real
value of funds used to ￿nance production. Furthermore, policy a⁄ects the loan and deposit
rates. We ￿nd that maintaining price stability at all times is not optimal; that the optimal
response to adverse ￿nancial shocks is to lower interest rates, if not at the zero bound, and
engineer a short period of in￿ ation; that the Taylor rule may implement allocations that
have opposite cyclical properties to the optimal ones.
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11 Introduction
During ￿nancial crises, credit conditions tend to worsen for all agents in the economy. In the
press, there are frequent calls for a looser monetary policy stance, on the grounds that this
helps avoid a deep recession and the risks of a credit crunch. The intuitive argument is that
lower interest rates tend to make it easier for ￿rms to obtain external ￿nance, thus countering
the e⁄ects of the tightening of credit standards. Arguments tracing back to Fisher (1933)
can also be used to call for some degree of in￿ ation during ￿nancial crises, so as to avoid an
excessive increase in ￿rms￿leverage through a devaluation of their nominal liabilities.
It is less clear, however, whether these arguments would withstand a more formal analysis.
In this paper, we present a model that can be used to evaluate them. More speci￿cally, we
address the following questions: How should monetary policy respond to ￿nancial shocks? How
should it respond to real shocks, when ￿nancial conditions a⁄ect macroeconomic outcomes?
Should monetary policy engineer some in￿ ation during recessions? How relevant is the zero
bound on the nominal interest rate?
To answer these questions, we use a model where monetary policy has the ability to a⁄ect
the ￿nancing conditions of ￿rms. Our set-up has three distinguishing features. First, ￿rms￿
internal and external funds are imperfect substitutes. This is due to the presence of information
asymmetries, between ￿rms and banks, regarding ￿rms￿productivity and to the fact that
monitoring is a costly activity for banks. Second, ￿rms￿internal and external funds are nominal
assets. Third, those funds, both internal and external, as well as the interest rate on bank
loans, are predetermined when aggregate shocks occur.
We ￿nd that, in our environment, maintaining price stability at all times is not optimal.
In response to technology shocks, for example, the price level should move to adjust the real
value of total funds. If the shock is negative, the price level increases on impact to lower real
funds as well as the real wage. Subsequently, the price level falls in order to increase the real
wage at the same pace as productivity, in the convergence back to the steady state. Along the
adjustment path, deposit and loan rates, spreads, ￿nancial markups, leverage, and bankruptcy
rates remain stable. Therefore, under the optimal policy, if technology shocks were the only
shocks hitting the economy, bankruptcies would be acyclical.
The optimal response to a ￿nancial shock that reduces ￿rms￿internal funds, increasing
￿rms￿leverage, also involves an increase in the price level on impact, in order to lower real funds
2and the real wage. The short period of controlled in￿ ation mitigates the adverse consequences
of the shock on bankruptcy rates and allows ￿rms to de-leverage more quickly.
We also ￿nd that a policy response according to a simple Taylor-type rule can be costly,
in the sense of inducing more persistent deviations in real variables from their optimal values
and higher bankruptcy rates. In response to technology shocks, bankruptcies become coun-
tercyclical under the simple rule. In response to a ￿nancial shock that reduces internal funds,
there is de￿ ation initially, which increases the real value of total funds and leads to a much
larger increase in leverage. The reduction in output is smaller than under the optimal policy
and markups decrease, inducing higher bankruptcy rates.
In the baseline version of our model, the optimal deposit rate is zero, corresponding to
the Friedman rule. Because assets are nominal and predetermined, for given nominal interest
rates, there are many possible equilibrium allocations, and therefore ample room for policy.
To analyze the optimal interest rate reaction to shocks, we introduce government con-
sumption as an exogenous share of production. This assumption generates a rationale for
proportionate taxation. The deposit rate acts as a tax on consumption and therefore the
optimal steady-state deposit rate becomes positive ￿the Friedman rule is no longer optimal.
When the optimal average interest rate is away from the lower bound, it may be optimal for
the interest rate to respond to shocks. This is indeed the case for ￿nancial shocks, but not for
technology shocks. In response to technology shocks, it is optimal to keep rates constant even
if they could be lowered. For all ￿nancial shocks, the ￿ exibility of moving the nominal interest
rate downwards allows policy to speed up the adjustment. Moreover, the e⁄ect of these shocks
on output can be considerably mitigated. For instance, a shock that reduces the availability of
internal funds is persistently contractionary when the short term nominal rate is kept ￿xed at
zero, while it is less contractionary and very short-lived when the average interest rate is away
from the lower bound and the short term nominal rate is reduced.
In order to understand the mechanisms responsible for these results, we analyze a simpli-
￿ed model in which internal and external funds are perfect substitutes (i.e. monitoring costs
are zero). We use this model to illustrate that the two assumptions of nominal denomina-
tion and predetermination of the funds used to ￿nance production are su¢ cient conditions
for changes in the price level to a⁄ect allocations. For this speci￿c case, we show that, in
response to a technology shock, the optimal monetary policy aims at keeping the nominal
wage constant. This is achieved by inducing movements in the price level such that the real
3wage adjusts to productivity. Because, under log-linear preferences, labor does not move ei-
ther, nominal predetermined funds are ex-post optimal. Finally, we use this model to evaluate
the role played by asymmetric information and monitoring costs in explaining business cycle
￿ uctuations. Although these imperfections play a quantitatively minor role in determining the
cyclical behavior of non-￿nancial variables, they tend to amplify the reaction of the economy
to shocks.
Our paper relates to the literature that analyzes the e⁄ect of ￿nancial factors on the trans-
mission of shocks. In our model, ￿nancial factors play a role because of costly state veri￿cation,
as in Bernanke et al (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998). We also contribute to the
recent literature that analyzes the role of ￿nancial factors for optimal monetary policy (see e.g.
Curdia and Woodford (2008), De Fiore and Tristani (2008), Ravenna and Walsh (2006), and
Faia (2008)). The main di⁄erences relative to those models are the nominal denomination of
debt, as in Christiano et al (2003) and De Fiore and Tristani (2008), and the assumption that
assets are decided before observing the aggregate shocks, as in Svensson (1985). It follows that,
in our setup, monetary policy a⁄ects allocations by setting the nominal interest rate but also
by choosing an appropriate path for prices. This has important implications for the cyclical
properties of the economy under the optimal policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we outline the environment and describe the
equilibria. Then, we derive implementability conditions and we characterize optimal monetary
policy. In section 3, we provide numerical results on the response of the economy to various
shocks. We describe results both under the optimal monetary policy and a sub-optimal (Taylor)
rule. We compare the case where the level of government consumption is exogenous and the
optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule, to the case where government consumption is
a ￿xed share of output and the optimal average interest rate is away from zero. In section 4,
we analyze a simple model in which internal and external funds are perfect substitutes, and
use it to provide some intuition on the results obtained for the general model. In section 5, we
conclude.
2 Model
We consider a model where ￿rms need internal and external funds to produce and they fail if
they are not able to repay their debts. Both internal funds and ￿rm debt are nominal assets.
4There is a goods market at the beginning of the period and an assets market at the end, where
funds are decided for the following period. Funds are predetermined.
Production uses labor only with a linear technology. Aggregate productivity is stochastic.
In addition, each ￿rm faces an idiosyncratic shock whose realization is private information.
The households have preferences over consumption, labor and real money. For convenience
we assume separability for the utility in real balances.1
Banks are ￿nancial intermediaries. They are zero pro￿t, zero risk operations. Banks take
deposits from households and allocate them to entrepreneurs on the basis of a debt contract
where the entrepreneurs repay their debts if production is su¢ cient and default otherwise,
handing in total production to the banks, provided these pay the monitoring costs. Because
there is aggregate uncertainty, we assume that the government can make lump sum transfers
between the households and the banks that ensure that banks have zero pro￿ts in every state.
This way the banks are able to pay a risk free rate on deposits.
Entrepreneurs need to borrow in advance to ￿nance production. The payments on out-
standing debt are not state dependent. Entrepreneurs accumulate internal funds inde￿nitely.
A tax on these funds ensures that there is always a need for external funds.
Monetary policy can a⁄ect the real value of total funds available for the production of ￿rms,
but it can also a⁄ect the real value of debt that needs to be repaid. Furthermore, monetary
policy also a⁄ects the deposit and loan rates.
2.1 Households
At the end of period t in the assets market, households decide on holdings of money Mt that
they will be able to use at the beginning of period t+1 in the goods market, and on one-period
deposits denominated in units of currency Dt that will pay Rd
tDt in the assets market in period
t+1. Deposits are riskless, in the sense that banks do not fail. The households also decide on a
portfolio of nominal state-contingent bonds At+1 each paying a unit of currency in a particular
state in period t + 1. The state-contingent bonds cost EtQt;t+1At+1, where Qt;t+1 is the price
in units of money at t of each bond normalized by the conditional probability of occurrence of
the state at t + 1.
1We also assume a negligible contribution of real balances to welfare. This does not mean that the economy
is cashless since ￿rms face a cash-in-advance constraint.
5The budget constraint at period t is
Mt + EtQt;t+1At+1 + Dt ￿ At + Rd
t￿1Dt￿1 + Mt￿1 ￿ Ptct + Wtnt ￿ Tt; (1)
where ct is the amount of the ￿nal consumption good purchased, Pt is its price, nt is hours
worked, Wt is the nominal wage, and Tt are lump-sum nominal taxes collected by the govern-
ment.





￿t [u(ct;mt) ￿ ￿nt]
)
; (2)
subject to (1). Here uc > 0; um ￿ 0; ucc < 0;umm < 0, ￿ > 0 and mt ￿ Mt￿1=Pt denotes real
balances. Throughout we will assume that the utility function is separable in real money, mt,
and that the contribution to welfare is negligible.


















￿uc (t + 1)
Pt+1
; (5)
Etum (t + 1)
Etuc (t + 1)
= Rd
t ￿ 1: (6)
2.2 Production
The production sector is composed of a continuum of ￿rms, indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Each ￿rm is
endowed with a stochastic technology that transforms Ni;t units of labor into !i;tAtNi;t units
of output. The random variable !i;t is i.i.d. across time and across ￿rms, with distribution
￿, density ￿ and mean one. At is an aggregate productivity shock. The shock !i;t is private
information, but its realization can be observed by the ￿nancial intermediary at the cost of a
share ￿ of the ￿rm￿ s output.
The ￿rms decide in the assets market at t ￿ 1 the amount of internal funds to be avail-
able in period t, Bi;t￿1. Lending occurs through the ￿nancial intermediary, which is able to
obtain a safe return. The existence of aggregate shocks occurring during the duration of the
contract implies that the intermediary￿ s return from the lending activity is not safe, regardless
6of its ability to di⁄erentiate across the continuum of ￿rms facing i.i.d. shocks. We assume
the existence of a deposit insurance scheme that the government implements by completely
taxing away the intermediary￿ s pro￿ts whenever the aggregate shock is relatively high, and by
providing subsidies up to the point where pro￿ts are zero when the aggregate shock is relatively
low. Such policy guarantees that the intermediary is always able to repay the safe return to
the household, thus insuring households￿deposits from aggregate risk.
2.2.1 The ￿nancial contract
The ￿rms pay wages in advance of production. Each ￿rm is restricted to hire and pay wages
according to
WtNi;t ￿ Xi;t￿1, (7)
where Xi;t￿1 are total funds, internal plus external, decided at the assets market in period t￿1,
to be available in period t. The ￿rms have internal funds Bi;t￿1 and borrow Xi;t￿1 ￿ Bi;t￿1.
The loan contract stipulates a payment of Rl
i;t￿1 (Xi;t￿1 ￿ Bi;t￿1), where Rl
i;t￿1 is not con-
tingent on the state at t, when the ￿rm is able to meet those payments, i.e. when !i;t ￿ !i;t,
where !i;t is the minimum productivity level such that the ￿rm is able to pay the ￿xed return
to the bank, so that
PtAt!i;tNi;t = Rl
i;t￿1 (Xi;t￿1 ￿ Bi;t￿1). (8)
Otherwise the ￿rm goes bankrupt, and hands out all the production PtAt!i;tNi;t. In this case,
a constant fraction ￿t of the ￿rm￿ s output is destroyed in monitoring, so that the bank gets
(1 ￿ ￿t)PtAt!i;tNi;t.














Total output is split between the ￿rm, the bank, and monitoring costs
f (!i;t) + g (!i;t;￿t) = 1 ￿ ￿tG(!i;t);
where G(!i;t) =
R !i;t
0 !i;t￿(d!). On average, ￿tG(!i;t) of output is lost in monitoring.





that solves the following problem:
Maximize the expected production accruing to ￿rms
max Et￿1 [f (!i;t)PtAtNi;t]
subject to
WtNi;t ￿ Xi;t￿1 (11)
Et￿1 [g (!i;t;￿t)PtAtNi;t] ￿ Rd
t￿1 (Xi;t￿1 ￿ Bi;t￿1) (12)
Et￿1 [f (!i;t)PtAtNi;t] ￿ Rd
t￿1Bi;t￿1 (13)
where g (!i;t;￿t) and f (!i;t) are given by (10) and (9), respectively, and !i;t is given by (8).2
The informational structure in the economy corresponds to a costly state veri￿cation (CSV)
problem. The optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneur￿ s expected return subject to the
borrowing constraint for ￿rms, (11), the ￿nancial intermediary receiving an amount not lower
on average than the repayment requested by the household (the safe return on deposits), (12),
and the entrepreneur being willing to sign the contract, (13).
The decisions on Xi;t￿1 and Bi;t￿1 are made in period t ￿ 1 at the assets market. We can
replace Ni;t =
Xi;t￿1































where f (!i;t) and g (!i;t;￿t) are given by (10) and (9), respectively, and, using (8), which can











Given that Bi;t￿1 is exogenous to this problem and is predetermined, we can multiply and




2The problem is written under the assumption that it is optimal to produce, rather than just hold the funds.
This is true as long as PtAtNi;t ￿ Xi;t￿1. If it is optimal to produce, then the ￿nancial constraint (11) holds
with equality, so that it is optimal to produce as long as
PtAt
Wt ￿ 1. As long as the economy is su¢ ciently away
from the ￿rst best without ￿nancial costs, this condition should be satis￿ed.
8!i;t, only. The objective and the constraints of the problem are the same for all ￿rms. The
only ￿rm speci￿c variable would be Bi;t￿1 in the objective, but this would be irrelevant for the
maximization problem. Hence, the solution for
Bi;t￿1
Xi;t￿1, Rl
i;t￿1, and !i;t is the same across ￿rms.
Name bt￿1 ￿
Bi;t￿1
Xi;t￿1 and vt ￿ PtAt
Wt . We can then rewrite !i;t, using (8), as
!i;t ￿ !t =
Rl
t￿1 (1 ￿ bt￿1)
vt
: (17)
This condition, de￿ning the threshold, together with the ￿rst-order conditions of the optimal
contract problem that can be written as3








Et￿1 [vtg (!t;￿t)] = Rd








Entrepreneurs are in￿nitely lived and have linear preferences over consumption with rate of
time preference ￿e. We assume ￿e su¢ ciently low so that the return on internal funds is always
higher than the preference discount 1
￿e: Entrepreneurs then accumulate their entire share of
production as internal funds and never consume. They pay lump-sum taxes which prevents
their wealth from growing inde￿nitely.
The accumulation of internal funds is given by
Bt = f (!t)PtAtNt ￿ Tt; (20)
The tax revenues are
Tt = ￿tf (!t)PtAtNt: (21)
They are transferred to the households or used for government consumption. The taxes are
lump-sum, so that the entrepreneurs do not internalize that they are being taxed at the rate
￿t. The accumulation of funds can then be written as




3This is shown in Appendix A.1
9We assume that government consumption is a share g of production net of the monitoring
costs,
Gt = gAtNt [1 ￿ ￿tG(!t)]:
The resource constraint is then given by
ct = (1 ￿ g)AtNt [1 ￿ ￿tG(!t)]: (23)
2.4 Equilibria
The equilibrium conditions are given by equations (3)-(6), (7) holding with equality, (17), (18),
(19),
Bi;t = btXi;t; (24)
together with (22), (23), and the market clearing conditions
Mt + Bt = Ms
t
Dt = Xt ￿ Bt;
Z





Xi;tdi = Xt; and where f (!t) and g (!t;￿t) are given by (9) and (10),
respectively, with !t replacing !it.













The equilibrium conditions are summarized in Appendix A.2, where we also show that,
given a set path for the price level, there is a unique equilibrium for all the other variables.
We do not need to be explicit about how monetary policy is conducted in order to pin down
a unique path for the price level and therefore a unique equilibrium for the real allocations.4
4That is an issue that is behond the scope of this paper and is present in every monetary model.
102.5 Implementability conditions
We can use the de￿nition of vt in equation (3), (18) and (19), and combine these last two






1 ￿ ￿tG(!t) ￿ f (!t)
Et￿1 [￿t!t￿(!t)]
Et￿1 [1 ￿ ￿(!t)]
￿￿
= Rd
t￿1, t ￿ 1. (26)
Using the de￿nition bt = Bt=Xt, the smallest set of implementability conditions in ct, Nt, !t,
Rd
t￿1, bt￿1, Rl


















, t ￿ 1 (27)
!t =
Rl
t￿1 (1 ￿ bt￿1)
uc(t)At
￿






uc (t ￿ 1)At￿1
￿
= Rd
t￿1bt￿1￿Et￿1Nt, t ￿ 1, (29)
(1 ￿ gt)AtNt [1 ￿ ￿tG(!t)] = ct, t ￿ 0. (30)
2.6 Optimal policy
We consider two di⁄erent cases, one where exogenous government consumption is at some level
G, and a second case, where government consumption is an exogenous share of production g.
The two assumptions have very di⁄erent implications for the optimal nominal interest rate. In
the ￿rst case, we can show analytically that the Friedman rule is optimal in the steady state,
Rd = 1. It is also optimal in response to shocks, in the calibrated version we analyze below.
In the second case, it is optimal to distort the consumption-leisure margin, even if lump-sum
taxes are available. Since the nominal interest rate acts as a consumption tax, it is optimal to
set it higher than zero.
Setting the nominal interest rate does not exhaust monetary policy. Because the funds
are nominal and predetermined, there is still a role for policy. For instance, in response to a
technology shock, the optimal price level policy is aimed at keeping the nominal wage constant.
The price level adjusts so that the real wage moves with productivity. As a result, labor does
not move, wages do not move and therefore, nominal predetermined funds are ex-post optimal.
In order to show that, when government consumption is at some exogenous level G, the
Friedman rule is optimal in the steady state, we ￿rst show that steady-state bankruptcy rates
11are independent of monetary policy. Using equations (26) and (27), evaluated at the steady
















Equation (32) implies that the steady-state bankruptcy rate is indeed independent of the policy
rate Rd or in￿ ation.
The restrictions of the maximization of the steady-state utility u(c)￿￿n, (26) through (30)









the condition that ! does not depend on policy, (32), and the resource constraint,
AN [1 ￿ ￿G(!)] = c + G; (34)
together with the implicit restriction that the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, Rd ￿ 1:
The other two conditions determine Rl and b. For an exogenous ! given by (32), suppose we
were to maximize utility u(c) ￿ ￿n; subject to the steady-state resource constraint (34) only.







From (33), this could only be satis￿ed if either ￿ = 0 or ! = 0; and Rd = 1. When credit
frictions are present, and f (!)
￿!￿(!)
1￿￿(!) 6= 0, there is a reason to subsidize consumption, which
in this economy can only be done by reducing the nominal interest rate. Since Rd ￿ 1; it is
optimal to set Rd = 1, as a corner solution. The Friedman rule is optimal.
With g > 0; it may be optimal to tax on average. The same argument as above cannot go





(1 ￿ g)[1 ￿ ￿G(!)]
: (35)
In spite of the reason to subsidize, due to f (!t)
￿!￿(!)
1￿￿(!), if g is high enough, it is optimal to
tax. Then, as we show in the simulations below, it will be optimal to tax at di⁄erent rates, in
response to shocks.
12When g = 0; in the calibrated version we analyze below, the Friedman rule is optimal also






1 ￿ ￿tG(!t) ￿ f (!t)
Et￿1 [￿t!t￿(!t)]
Et￿1 [1 ￿ ￿(!t)]
￿￿
= 1. (36)
This condition provides some intuition on what is at stake for optimal policy.
uc(t)At
￿ is the
wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation if





the ￿nancial markup present in models with asymmetric information and bankruptcy costs.
The wedge has to be equal to the ￿nancial markup, on average, but not always in response to
shocks.
As the numerical results will show, for logarithmic preferences, the optimal policy in
response to technology shocks is to fully stabilize the ￿nancial markup, therefore keeping
bankruptcy rates constant, and setting the wedge equal to the constant ￿nancial markup.
Given that the utility is logarithmic, consumption is proportional to the technology shock,
which implies that labor does not move, from (30). From (11), we have that Xt￿1 = PtAt
vt Nt.
Since Nt = N, vt = v, and Xt￿1 does not vary with shocks in t, it must be that the price level
is inversely proportional to the technology shock. Since nominal funds are predetermined and
labor does not move, the optimal policy is to keep the nominal wage constant and adjust the
price level to the movements in the real wage.
3 Numerical results
The model calibration is very standard. We assume utility to be logarithmic in consumption
and linear in leisure. Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), we calibrate the volatility of
idiosyncratic productivity shocks and the rate of accumulation of internal funds, 1￿￿t, so as to
generate an annual steady state credit spread of approximately 2% and a quarterly bankruptcy
rate of approximately 1%.5 The monitoring cost parameter ￿ is set at 0:15 following Levin et
al. (2004).
In the rest of this section, we always focus on adverse shocks, i.e. shocks which tend to
generate a fall in output. Impulse responses under optimal policy refer to an equilibrium in
which policy is described by the ￿rst order conditions of a Ramsey planner deciding allocations
5The exact values are 1:8% for the annual spread and 1:1% for the bankruptcy rate.
13for all times t ￿ 1, but ignoring the special nature of the initial period t = 0. Responses under
a Taylor rule refer to an equilibrium in which policy is set according to the following simple
interest rate rule:
b it = 1:5 ￿ b ￿t (37)
where hats denote logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state.
In all cases, we only study the log-linear dynamics of the model.
3.1 Impulse responses under optimal policy
Optimal policy in the calibrated version of the model entails setting the nominal interest
rate permanently to zero, as long as the level of government consumption is exogenous. This
restriction is imposed when computing impulse responses.
3.1.1 Technology shocks: price stability is not optimal
Figure 1 shows the impulse response of selected macroeconomic variables to a negative, 1%
technology shock under optimal policy. The variables are production AtNt (designated by yt),
real internal funds
Bt￿1
Pt (designated by bt), and in￿ ation Pt
Pt￿1 (designated by ￿t). Bankruptcy
rates, markups, spreads, and leverage are not represented because there is no e⁄ect of the
shock on those under the optimal policy.
It is important to recall that the model includes many features which could potentially
lead to equilibrium allocations that are far from the ￿rst best: asymmetric information and
monitoring costs; the predetermination of ￿nancial decisions; and the nominal denomination
of debt contracts. At the same time, the presence of nominal predetermined contracts implies
that monetary policy is capable of a⁄ecting allocations by choosing appropriate sequences of
prices.
Figure 1 illustrates that optimal policy is able to replicate the ￿rst-best response of con-
sumption and labor allocations to a technology shock.6 In response to the negative technology
shock, since nominal internal and external funds are predetermined, optimal policy generates
in￿ ation for 1 period. As a result, the real value of total funds needed to ￿nance production
falls exactly by the amount necessary to generate the correct reduction in output.
In subsequent periods, the real value of total funds is slowly increased through a mild
reduction in the price level. Along the adjustment path, leverage remains constant and ￿rms
6The allocations are distorted, but the responses are as in the ￿rst best.
14make no losses. Consumption moves one-to-one with technology, while hours worked remain
constant. With constant labor and an equilibrium nominal wage that stays constant, the
restriction that funds are predetermined is not relevant. The price level adjusts so that the
real wage is always equal to productivity. Since total funds are always at the desired level, the
accumulation equation for nominal funds never kicks in.
The impulse responses in Figure 1 would obviously be symmetric after a positive technology
shock. Hence, perfect price stability ￿i.e. an equilibrium in which the price level is kept
perfectly constant at all points in time ￿is not optimal in our model (we show below that this
is the case for all shocks, not just technology shocks). Short in￿ ationary episodes are useful to
help ￿rms adjust their funds, both internal and external, to their production needs. In the case
of technology shocks, this policy also prevents any undesirable ￿ uctuations in the economy￿ s
bankruptcy rate, ￿nancial markup, or the markup resulting from the predetermination of
assets.
This result is robust to a number of perturbations of the model. It also holds if there are
reasons not to keep the nominal interest rate at zero. And it holds in a model where internal
and external funds are perfect substitutes.
Figure 1: Impulse responses to a negative technology shock under optimal policy
15Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation of the shock: 0.9.
3.1.2 Financial shocks
We can analyze the impulse responses to three types of ￿nancial shocks in our economy. The
￿rst is an increase in ￿t, namely a shock which generates an exogenous reduction in the level of
internal funds. The second one is a shock to the standard deviation of idiosyncratic technology
shocks, which amounts to an increase in the uncertainty of the economic environment. The
third shock is an increase in the monitoring cost parameter ￿t.
We focus on the ￿rst shock. The other two shocks are analyzed in Appendix 3. The impulse
responses to ￿t in Figure 2 are interesting because they generate at the same time a reduction
in output and an increase in leverage ￿leverage can be de￿ned as the ratio of external to
internal funds used in production, i.e. as 1=bt ￿ 1, and it is therefore negatively related to bt.
To highlight the di⁄erent persistence of the e⁄ects of the shock, depending on the prevailing
policy rule, we focus on a serially uncorrelated shock. The variables are, in addition to the
ones in Figure 1, consumption, ct, the share of ￿rms that go bankrupt, ￿(!t), the markup,
16vt, the spread between the lending and the deposit rate, ￿t+1 ￿ Rl
t+1 ￿Rd
t+1, and the ratio of
internal to total funds bt+1 =
Bt+1
Xt+1.
Figure 2: Impulse responses to a fall in the value of internal funds under optimal policy
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Serially uncorrelated shock.
The higher ￿ does not have an e⁄ect on funds on impact because of the predetermination of
￿nancing decisions, but it represents a fall in internal funds at t+1, which leads to an increase
in ￿rms￿leverage.
We will see below that under a Taylor rule this shock brings about a period of de￿ ation,
which would be quite persistent if the original shock were also persistent. The optimal policy
response, instead, is to create a short-lived period of in￿ ation. The impact increase in the
price level lowers the real value of total funds, so as to decrease labor and production levels.
Mark ups increase on impact, as output and consumption decrease, so that the future cut in
internal funds can be partially o⁄set. The higher pro￿ts allow ￿rms to quickly start rebuilding
their internal funds. The adjustment process is essentially complete after 3 years. When
17consumption starts growing towards the steady state, the real rate must increase. For given
nominal interest rate, there must be a period of mild de￿ ation.
3.2 Taylor rule policy
We now compare the impulse responses under optimal policy with those in which policy follows
the simple Taylor rule in equation (37).
3.2.1 Technology shocks and the cyclicality of bankruptcies
In response to a negative technology shock, the simple Taylor rule tries to stabilize in￿ ation
(see Figure 3). The large amount of nominal funds that ￿rms carry over from the previous
period, therefore, has high real value. Given the available funds, ￿rms hire more labor and
the output contraction is relatively small, compared to what would be optimal at the new
productivity level. As a result, the wage share increases and ￿rms make lower pro￿ts, hence
they must sharply reduce their internal funds. Leverage goes up, and so do the credit spread
and the bankruptcy rate. In the period after the shock, ￿rms start accumulating funds again,
but accumulation is slow and output keeps falling for a whole year after the shock. It is only
in the second year after the shock that the recovery begins.
Figure 3 illustrates how our model is able to generate realistic, cyclical properties for the
credit spread and the bankruptcy ratio. An increase in bankruptcies is almost a de￿nition of
recession in the general perception, while the fact that credit spreads are higher during NBER
recession dates is documented, for example, in Levin et al. (2004). Generating the correct
cyclical relationship between credit spreads, bankruptcies and output is not straightforward
in models with ￿nancial frictions. For example, spreads are unrealistically procyclical in the
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 2000) framework. The reason is that ￿rms￿￿nancing decisions are
state contingent in those papers. Firms can choose how much to borrow from the banks after
observing aggregate shocks. Should a negative technology shock occur, they would immediately
borrow less and try to cut production. This would avoid large drops in their pro￿ts and internal
funds, so that their leverage would not increase. As a result, bankruptcy rates and credit
spreads could remain constant or decrease during the recession.
18Figure 3: Impulse responses to a negative technology shock under a Taylor rule
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation of the shock: 0.9.
The blue lines indicate impulse responses under the Taylor rule; the black lines report the impulse
responses under optimal policy already shown in Figure 1.
In our model, economic outcomes are reversed because of the pre-determination in ￿nan-
cial decisions. Firms￿loans are no-longer state contingent, hence they cannot be changed after
observing aggregate shocks. This assumption implies that ￿rms are constrained in their im-
pact response to disturbances. After a negative technology shock, ￿rms ￿nd themselves with
excessive funds and their pro￿ts will fall because production levels do not fall enough. The
reverse would happen during an expansionary shock, when production would initially increase
too little and pro￿ts would be high.
Our model also generates a realistically hump-shaped impulse response of output and con-
sumption without the need for additional assumptions, such as habit persistence in households￿
preferences. Once a shock creates the need for changes in internal funds, these changes can
only take place slowly. Compared to the habit persistence assumption, our model implies that
the hump-shape in impulse responses is policy-dependent. After a technology shock, optimal
19policy keeps internal funds at their optimal level at any point in time. Firms do not need
to accumulate, or decumulate, internal funds, and, as a result, the hump in the response of
output and consumption disappears.
3.2.2 Shocks to the value of internal assets
Contrary to the optimal policy case, under a Taylor rule this shock leads to a fall, rather than
an increase, in the price level.
The situation in which ￿rms￿leverage increase and de￿ ation ensues is akin to the "initial
state of over-indebtedness" described in Fisher (1933). In Fisher￿ s theory, ￿rms try to de-
leverage through a fast debt liquidation and the selling tends to drive down prices. If monetary
policy accommodates this trend, the price level also falls and the real value of ￿rms liabilities
increase further, leading to even higher leverage and further selling.
In our model, over-indebtedness and leverage are also exacerbated by de￿ ation, but the
mechanics of the model are di⁄erent (see Figure 4). The progressive increase in leverage
leads to an increase in the economy￿ s bankruptcy rate, and a protracted fall in consumption.
This, in turn, is associated with a fall in the real interest rate which, given the policy rule,
is implemented through a cut in the nominal rate in spite of a small de￿ ationary period.
De-leveraging occurs through an accumulation of assets, rather than a liquidation of debt.
However, the de-leveraging process is very slow and consumption is still away from the steady
state three years after the shock. Compared to the optimal policy case, the recession is more
persistent and it comes at the cost of a higher bankruptcy rate and a higher credit spread.
20Figure 4: Impulse responses to a fall in the value of internal assets under a Taylor rule
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. The shock is serially uncorre-
lated. The blue lines indicate impulse responses under the Taylor rule; the black lines report the
impulse responses under optimal policy already shown in Figure 2.
3.2.3 Policy shocks
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to a serially correlated shock to the Taylor rule, corre-
sponding to a cut in the policy rate.
The shock is useful to illustrate the general features of the "monetary policy transmission
mechanism" in this model. These are characterized by the slow mechanism of accumulation of
internal funds, which produces very persistent responses in all variables.
21Figure 5: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation of the shock: 0.9.
The shock generates an immediate fall in the price level which boosts the real value of
￿rms￿nominal funds and induces a boom in production and consumption through an increase
in employment higher real wages. Since leverage is predetermined in the ￿rst period, the higher
production level brings about an increase in the bankruptcy rate. Pro￿ts fall and, after one
period, ￿rms ￿nd themselves short of internal funds and start rebuilding them. The adjustment
process is very slow. Three years after the shock, output, consumption and employment are
still far away from the steady state.
3.3 Optimal policy when a non-zero interest rate is optimal
In this section, we explore to which extent the optimal policy recommendations described
above are a⁄ected by the fact that the nominal interest rate is kept constant at zero. In the
calibration, we keep all other parameters unchanged, but we assume there is a ￿xed share of
government consumption g = 0:02 in the steady state. As discussed above, the optimal steady
22state level of the nominal interest rate increases proportionately. That is the reason why we
consider g to be a small number, because it will correspond to a relatively small nominal
interest rate. As a result, there is also an increase in the steady state level of the credit spread
and of the bankruptcy rate.7
3.3.1 Technology shocks
In spite of the availability of the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument, the optimal
response to a technology shock is the same as before. As already discussed, policy is able to
replicate the same response of the allocations which would be attained in a frictionless model
even when the nominal interest rate must be kept constant (at zero). There are therefore no
reasons to deviate from that policy even if the nominal interest rate can be moved.
3.3.2 Financial shocks
For all ￿nancial shocks, the ￿ exibility of using the nominal interest rate allows policy to speed
up the adjustment after ￿nancial shocks. The e⁄ect of these shocks on output is considerably
mitigated. We illustrate this general result with a serially uncorrelated shock to ￿.
The impulse responses to this shock under the optimal policy are shown in Figure 6, together
with the impulse responses in the case where the Friedman rule is optimal. The most striking
result is that the impact of this shock on output, which is persistently contractionary when
the short term nominal rate is kept ￿xed at zero, is less contractionary and very short-lived
when the interest rate can be reduced.
Given that output is at the steady state after an impact decrease, policy does not need
to generate persistent in￿ ation to kick-start the process of accumulation of nominal funds. It
can improve credit conditions directly, by reducing the policy interest rate and therefore, loan
rates. While the increase in the credit spread is larger here than in the case when the Friedman
rule is optimal, the increase is o⁄set by the reduction in the policy rate.
7In the steady state, the credit spread increases to 1.27% and the bankruptcy rate to 6.7%.
23Figure 6: Impulse responses to a fall in the value of internal assets under optimal policy
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation of the shock: 0.9.
The violet lines indicate impulse responses under optimal policy when g > 0; the black lines report
the impulse responses under optimal policy already shown in Figure 2.
The e⁄ect on the other variables is comparable to the case in which the Friedman rule is
optimal, but the adjustment process is much faster.
4 The case in which internal and external funds are perfect
substitutes
In order to better understand the results of our general model, we analyze a simpli￿ed case in
which assets are predetermined, but internal and external funds are perfect substitutes - i.e.
monitoring costs are zero.
Even in the absence of asymmetric information and costly state veri￿cation, it is not optimal
to maintain price stability at all times. Hence, the predetermination of assets and the nominal
denomination of funds are responsible for the deviation from price stability under the optimal
policy in the general model.
24As before, setting the interest rate does not exhaust the room for policy. Indeed, following
a technology shock, the optimal monetary policy induces movements in the price level that are
inversely proportional to the shock. The real wage moves with productivity despite nominal
wages being constant. Under log-linear preferences, labor does not move either, so that nominal
predetermined funds are ex-post optimal.
Finally, we use this model to evaluate the role played by asymmetric information and
monitoring costs in explaining business cycle ￿ uctuations. We ￿nd that, although these imper-
fections play a quantitatively minor role in determining the cyclical behavior of non-￿nancial
variables, they tend to amplify the reaction of the economy to shocks.
4.1 Price stability is not optimal
We consider the case where g > 0, and high enough so that the borrowing constraint of ￿rms
is always binding. In the model with ￿nancial frictions this was not necessary since positive
￿nancial markups guaranteed that the constraint was binding.
The equilibrium conditions in this economy are given by (3)-(6), together with
Rl
t￿1 = Rd
t￿1 = Rt￿1, t ￿ 1 (38)








, t ￿ 0 (40)
ct = (1 ￿ g)AtNt, t ￿ 0: (41)






= Rt￿1, t ￿ 1 (42)
ct = (1 ￿ g)AtNt, t ￿ 0 (43)
Every equilibrium sequence for ct, Nt, t ￿ 0, and Rt￿1, t ￿ 1, in this set can be implemented.
The other equilibrium conditions are satis￿ed by the choice of the remaining variables: (38)
determine Rl
t￿1 and Rd
t￿1, t ￿ 1. For t = 0, given a value X￿1 and an allocation c0 and N0,
(39) and (3) are satis￿ed by the choice of W0 and P0. For t ￿ 1, given an allocation ct and Nt,
and Rt￿1, conditions (3), (5) and (39) are satis￿ed by the choice of Wt, Pt and Xt￿1. There are
25two contemporaneous conditions and one predetermined condition for two contemporaneous
variables and one predetermined variable. (40) determines vt; (4) determines Q￿1
t￿1;t, and (6)
restricts mt.
The restriction that government consumption is a constant share of production is a second-
best restriction in this environment, implying the optimal use of proportionate taxation, even if
lump-sum taxation is available. The optimal, second-best, allocation maximizes utility subject
to the resource constraints







, t ￿ 0: (44)
This optimal allocation can be implemented in this economy with predetermined assets, since






, t ￿ 1:
In this economy, monetary policy does much more than just setting the interest rate.
Implementing the optimal allocation, requires moving the price level to adjust the real value
of funds.
Under log-linear preferences, labor would not move in response to shocks to productivity,
At. Since funds are predetermined, in (39), the wage rate could not move either and, from
(3), the price level would have to be inversely proportional to consumption, or to the shocks
to productivity.
4.2 The role of asymmetric information and monitoring costs
Figure 7 compares the reaction to a technology shock under the Taylor rule in the general model
of section 2 and in this benchmark model. The ￿gure shows that the di⁄erences between the
two cases are not overwhelming, but the model with asymmetric information and monitoring
costs tends to amplify business cycle ￿ uctuations in response to shocks. Compared to the
simple model (the green lines in Figure 7), the recession induced by a negative technology
shock is deeper when accompanied by an increase in credit spreads and in the bankruptcy
rate (the magenta lines). Employment ￿ uctuations are also more pronounced and so is the
volatility of in￿ ation and of the policy interest rate.
26Figure 7: Impulse responses to a negative techology shock under a Taylor rule
Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation of the shock: 0.9.
The green lines report the impulse responses in this benchmark model when g > 0; the magenta
lines indicate impulse responses in our full model when g > 0.
5 Conclusions
The model described in this paper represents an attempt to clarify the policy incentives created
by the nominal denomination of ￿rms￿debt. Our analysis is based on a number of simplifying
assumptions and does not aim to provide quantitative policy prescriptions. Nevertheless, we
highlight results that may be of relevance also in more general frameworks.
The ￿rst result is that maintaining price stability at all times is not optimal when ￿rms￿￿-
nancial positions are denominated in nominal terms and debt contracts are not state-contingent.
After a negative technology shock, for example, an impact increase in the price level stabilizes
￿rms￿leverage and allows for a more e¢ cient economic response to the shock. This ability of
monetary policy to in￿ uence the real value of ￿rms￿assets and liabilities derives from the as-
sumption that, when shocks occur, ￿nancial contracts are predetermined. The policy response
27through the price level is such that, in response to technology shocks, there is no need for the
central bank to adjust the nominal interest rate.
A second result is that the optimal response to an exogenous reduction in internal funds,
which amounts to an increase in ￿rms￿leverage, is to signi￿cantly reduce the nominal interest
rate, if the nominal rate is not at its zero bound, and to engineer a short period of controlled
in￿ ation. Both policy responses have the advantages of mitigating the adverse consequences
of the shock on bankruptcy rates and of allowing ￿rms to quickly de-leverage.
Finally, we show that a simple Taylor-type rule would produce signi￿cantly di⁄erent eco-
nomic outcomes from those prevailing if policy is set optimally. For example, under a Taylor
rule bankruptcy rates would increase during recessions, as it appears to be the case in the
empirical evidence. Bankruptcy rates would instead be acyclical under optimal policy.
A Appendix
A.1 The ￿nancial contract
Consider the optimal ￿nancial contract problem that maximizes (14) subject to (15) and (16),
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vt
: (45)




































where the functions g (:;￿t) and f (:) are given by (10) and (9), respectively.
28De￿ne as ￿1;t￿1 and ￿2;t￿1 the Lagrangean multipliers of (46) and (47) respectively. Con-
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where fj and gj, with j = 1;2, are the derivatives of f and g with respect to the ￿rst and




























































t￿1 (1 ￿ bt￿1):
From the second condition, since bt￿1 < 1 and ￿1t￿1 > 0,
Rl




























which veri￿es the conjecture that ￿2t￿1 = 0.
Using the de￿nition of the threshold, (45), the ￿rst-order conditions can be written as (18)
and (19).
A.2 Equilibria
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Bt￿2; t ￿ 1 (55)
(1 ￿ g)AtNt [1 ￿ ￿tG(!t)] = ct; t ￿ 0 (56)
The other equilibrium conditions determine the remaining variables.
Given the path for the price level there is a unique equilibrium for the other variables. To
see this, notice that at t = 0, given the values of b￿1; X￿1 and Rl
￿1; the equilibrium for c0,
N0, v0, !0, can be determined using (48), (52), (53), (56)for t = 0. Given these variables,
B￿1 = b￿1X￿1, and the path for the price level, Pt, the remaining variables ct, Nt, vt, !t,
Bt￿1, Rd
t￿1, bt￿1, Rl
t￿1, Xt￿1 for t ￿ 1, are determined using (48) - (56)for t ￿ 1. These are
4 contemporaneous variables and 5 predetermined variables, restricted by 4 contemporaneous
conditions and 5 predetermined conditions. If Pt are set exogenously, all the other variables
have a single solution. Alternatively, we could set exogenously Rd
t￿1, plus Pt in as many states
as #St ￿ #St￿1, and again there would be a unique equilibrium.
A.3 Impulse responses to ￿nancial shocks
We present here additional impulse responses to ￿nancial shocks in the baseline model where
the Friedman rule is optimal. Shocks are serially correlated with a 0:9 correlation coe¢ cient.
In all cases, we compare the impulse responses under the optimal policy to those arising under
the Taylor rule.
Figure A1: Impulse responses to an increase in ￿!t
30Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation of the shock: 0.9.
The blue lines indicate impulse responses under the Taylor rule; the black lines report the impulse
responses under optimal policy.
Figure A1 shows the impulse responses to a persistent increase in the riskiness of the
economy, i.e. to an increase in the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks !i;t. This
shock is associated with a prospective worsening of credit conditions and an increase in the
bankruptcy rate.
As in the case of the negative technology shock, the optimal monetary policy (black line)
engineers on impact an increase in the price level to reduce output. The ￿nancing conditions
stipulated before the shock are ex-post favorable to ￿rms: on impact, the output contraction
enables them to make higher pro￿ts, so that they will accumulate more internal funds in the
following period. This increase in internal funds allows for a fast economic recovery, in spite of
the contemporaneous increase in credit spreads. Even if the shock is serially correlated, output
and consumption are back at the steady state after 2 years.
Figure A2: Impulse responses to an increase in ￿t
31Note: Logarithmic deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Correlation of the shock: 0.9.
The blue lines indicate impulse responses under the Taylor rule; the black lines report the impulse
responses under optimal policy.
Under the Taylor rule (blue line), there is a sharp decrease in the deposit rate that impedes
the initial contraction of output and consumption. While under the optimal policy the price
level goes up on impact, here it goes down. Leverage, bankruptcy rates, and spreads are
higher than under the optimal policy. Internal funds are accumulated at a slower pace and the
recession is longer lasting.
Figure A2 plots the responses to an exogenous increase in the proportion of total funds
lost in monitoring activities, ￿t. This is di⁄erent from the shock previously analyzed because
it mechanically implies a higher waste of resources per unit of output. The optimal policy
response is to reduce output in order to minimize the resource loss. If the shock was not
serially correlated, this would once again be achieved through an impact increase in the price
level. Since the shock is persistent, however, policy needs to manage a trade-o⁄ between
immediate and future resource losses. An impact increase in the price level would not only
32immediately reduce output, but it would also lead to more pro￿ts and a faster accumulation
of internal funds. As in the case of an increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks, this
would imply a quick recovery, hence large future losses in monitoring activity as long as ￿t
remains high. Compared to this scenario, future losses would be minimized if the price level
were instead cut on impact, so that ￿rms￿leverage would increase and the accumulation of
internal funds would be especially slow. At the same time, however, an impact fall in the price
level would increase the real value of ￿rms￿funds which, in turn, would allow them to expand
production with an ensuing ampli￿cation of the impact resource loss due to the higher ￿t. It
turns out that the optimal response is to do almost nothing on impact, allowing for a very mild
fall in the price level. As a result, output does not fall ￿it actually increases slightly ￿and the
bankruptcy rate stays almost unchanged. It is only after one period that production falls, due
to an increase in both the credit spreads and the price level. Firms start from scratch their
slow process of accumulation of internal funds and the shock is reabsorbed very slowly.
In reaction to a shock to ￿t; the Taylor rule generates small di⁄erences relative to the
optimal policy case. The dynamics of the credit spread, of internal funds and of the bankruptcy
rate are almost identical. The resource loss in monitoring, however, is higher under the Taylor
rule, because output falls less in the few quarters after the shock, when ￿t is highest, and more
after 1 year, when ￿t is returning to its steady state level.
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